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Abstract 
A popular inclination into which we are all too prone to slip is the notion that science and 
religion are fundamentally and necessarily at odds. Recent developments have given credence to 
this inclination, as members of anti-scientific religious and atheistic scientific camps continue to 
decry each other as the world’s departure from the true approach to reality. Despite the depth of 
the inculcation of this exclusionist paradigm, it is a relatively new phenomenon that is difficult to 
locate with significant prevalence before the European Enlightenment. This paper presents an 
overview of the histories of science, religion, and their competition that show the any antagonism 
observed in either or both discipline is the result of undue distortions meant to garner hegemonic 
power over Europe and America. It then responds to these innovations by recasting science and 
religion into their respective appropriate domains, concluding that when this is done the two are 
entirely intellectually compatible.  
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Process Analysis Statement 
 Although I began formal research for this short paper only two months before beginning 
composition, I have been ruminating on many of the ideas expressed in it for roughly a decade. I 
was raised to believe that my devoutly Christian paradigm precluded the acceptance of select 
scientific propositions, particularly biological evolution and the multi-billion year ages of the 
earth and the universe. The older I grew, the more I came to understand and respect science. Yet 
not for a moment did it occur to me that my acceptance of scientific facts could in any way 
invalidate my religious inclinations – nor could the opposite take place. Instead, I consumed and 
produced, with increasing vigor and savvy, myriad apologies, theodicies and rhetorical strategies 
to refute claims of systemic or particular conflict and advance arguments for compatibility.   
 Therefore, by the time I began the project I was already fairly critical of attempts to 
render the two intellectually incompatible. This may suggest a degree of bias on my part, though 
I believe this bias is neither necessary nor real. For one thing, I find my arguments to be fairly 
sound, and reasonable enough to stand against scrutiny in spite of any amount of prejudice on the 
part of their originator; for another, no research is begun without the proposition of a hypothesis, 
which, in this case, is that science and religion cannot be rendered rationally incompatible – a 
hypothesis that was confirmed by my body of texts and reasoning. 
Accordingly, the process by which I produced this paper began with a collection and 
examination of relevant elements of this study – namely, of the essence and development of 
science, religion, arguments for their incompatibility and for their incompatibility. Admittedly, 
my time constraint (I devoted six weeks to research) necessitated limited research, and therefore 
I take certain things for granted, most critically that a popular understanding of conflict between 
the two exists at all. Because this seems obvious to me, I do not take great time to prove its 
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existence – a failure that does not significantly detract from my complementarian argument, and 
that will presumably be resolved if I revisit and expand upon this enterprise in the future. 
Alternatively, I chose to focus on tracking the historical development of relevant ideas, and 
examining arguments in support and in opposition to my hypothesis. 
 Initially, I worried that the inclusion of an entire chapter on history would be tangential to 
my thesis. However, it soon became clear that tracing these histories was vital, for two reasons: 
they demonstrate that 1) our modern, popular understanding that science and religion are not 
compatible originated in Europe and was spread throughout the world through Colonialism, and 
2) the ways in which science and religion are understood are fluid and vary appreciably across 
cultures, making it fallacious to situate their exact meanings solely in decidedly Eurocentric 
paradigms. This ways enough to substantiate my claim that the question of compatibility should 
be reopened, which I do in the following chapter where I show that the two cannot be construed 
as incompatible. While this had been my own interpretation for years by the time I began writing 
this essay, my research provided me with concrete and compelling arguments which I could not 
articulate well a few months ago.   
 While research was an invaluable component of this project, I never considered it a mere 
research paper that collects and presents objective data, but a rhetorical statement of my 
philosophical position on this issue, supported by what I find to be convincing evidence. The 
interjections of my own conclusions – my subjective interpretation of objective data – should 
neither surprise nor trouble the reader. I encourage the reader to view this thesis as I do: a 
contribution to an ongoing conversation on how to look at and treat epistemological and 
scientific claims. It is my fondest hope that the reader is deeply intrigued by this short treatise 
and is prompted to engage further with the relationship of science and religion, as I have been.  
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I. Introduction 
Jesus answered, “You say that I am a king. In fact, the reason I was born and came into 
the world is to testify to the truth. Everyone on the side of truth listens to me.”  
 “What is truth?” retorted Pilate.  
– John 18:37-38, New International Version 
 
 What is truth? This was the response of the Roman Governor, Pontius Pilate, to Jesus of 
Nazareth’s self-designation as the authority on truth, according to the account of Jesus’ Roman 
trial recorded in the Gospel of John. Positing this question is a fitting way to open this essay 
given that it, at its heart, concerns what information can be properly known to be true. The rise 
and pervasiveness of such phenomena as individualism, relativism and the so-called “fake news” 
makes it difficult to establish any concrete notion of reality. In an age where humanity has 
attained greater quantities of and access to information than ever before, we seem to be just as 
uncertain about the real nature of our lived experience as we have ever been, if not more so. 
 Of course, a sense of uncertainty is not a novel condition for humanity, but one that has 
plagued us as long as we can remember. The inherent entropy of nature means that we have we 
can never know what to expect at any given moment, and therefore have no way to anticipate 
and prepare for future events that may bear significant weight on our chances of survival. We are 
perpetually “flying blindly,” so to speak. It is only natural, then, for humans to seek means of 
bringing their lived realities to order. If we can successfully define the nature and operation of 
our world, the depth of our inherent uncertainty is diminished and we are better equipped to 
endure the vicissitudes of existence.  
 Archaeological and historical evidence demonstrates that the ancients were feverishly 
curious people. Thousands of years before the common era antiquity’s great civilizations – India, 
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Egypt, China and Mesopotamia – were discovering, documenting and utilizing mathematics, 
astronomy, cartography and communication, often with incredible accuracy.1 Obviously, these 
activities were not merely avocational frivolities or accidental encounters. The collection of 
knowledge was and continues to be an intentional undertaking designed to retrench treacherous 
uncertainty, and all the hazards therein. In addition to the aforementioned list of the engagements 
of ancient peoples – what I have listed is, at best, a tiny sampling – is the development of various 
phenomena that, today, would be classified as religion. The ancients were, universally, quite 
caught up in spiritual and supernatural activity. Conspicuously, they often failed to distinguish 
between the natural and the supernatural. Celestial bodies were simultaneously observable, 
quantifiable objects and deities; geological and astronomical events were understood as both 
naturally and divinely originated; Pythagoras’ scrupulous and accurate study of mathematics, 
music and astronomy led him to such supernatural conclusions that Shepherd refers to his 
resulting philosophy as “religion” and his students as “devotees.”2  
 Humanity once acknowledged a compatibility, sometimes a simultaneity, between the 
disciplines we now term “science” and “religion.” However, in recent centuries this relationship 
has progressively unraveled up to the present. Today, the prevailing opinion is that religion and 
science are not only categorically distinct but also diametrically and irreconcilably opposed. 
New-age atheists like Dawkins, Harris and Hitchens violently decry any sort of religious claim 
or activity as outmoded and worthless fiction, while ultra-conservative religious leaders of all 
stripes reject the legitimacy of a number of demonstrable scientific facts, like evolution and the 
age of the universe. Of course, it would be narrow-minded to claim that these extreme positions 
are the only two available. Yet, it is undeniable that the loudest voices in this discussion are 
consistently those that occupy the extremes.  
5 
 
More troubling, the false dilemma that one must endorse either science or religion, to the 
exclusion of the other, is not isolated to the highest intellectual levels of each “side” but has been 
effectively disseminated to society at large. On the first day of an undergraduate anthropology 
course in which I was enrolled in the Fall of my senior year at Ball State, I began a casual 
conversation with a classmate sitting next me about our academic majors and future career plans. 
I mentioned, in passing, that I am a Christian and plan to work vocationally as a minister and a 
missionary after graduation, to which my classmate responded that this was fine for me, but she 
preferred a more “scientific” approach to life that included evolution and rejected Creationism. 
Her response greatly dismayed me, demonstrating that, to her, it is not possible for one to 
simultaneously be a devoutly religious person and acknowledge scientific facts like evolution.  
The fact is that it is unequivocally possible for both to be concurrently true to the same 
person, as I and a great multitude of others prove. I am a deeply religious Protestant Christian 
who plans to devote his career to the propagation of the message of the God I serve. Yet, I 
wholeheartedly and unflinchingly acknowledge the validity of all legitimate scientific endeavors 
and findings (by “legitimate,” I mean to exclude claims billed as “scientific” but which are not 
derived via the Scientific Method but by philosophical and unempirical means). Countless 
conversations like that with my anthropology classmate have led me to reflect on the relationship 
between religion and science. For nearly a decade I have acknowledged no genuine conflict 
whatsoever between the two. Yet it is beyond doubt that much of the world vehemently disagrees 
with assessments like mine. Today, conflict between science and religion is an unassailable 
reality. Yet this need not be the case. In the past, it has not been the case. It is my intention, then, 
to present my counterargument to the fallacy that science and religion cannot rationally coexist.  
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Overview, Goals and Thesis 
 In our modern cultural and philosophical climate, it may be easy for an effort such as this 
to devolve into a mere defense of one position over the other. A good example is Timothy 
Keller’s The Reason for God. Keller asserts that purely religious, scientifically untestable claims 
(e.g. the existence of God) cannot rationally be rejected by scientists, because there are no 
empirical grounds against which to verify or refute such claims.3 He even recognizes that this 
fact means that these same religious claims cannot be definitively proven.4 Yet, he fails to 
emphasize the reverse to this line of reasoning, which is that those who reject scientific claims 
purely on the basis of religious belief commit the same fallacy by falsely applying the standards 
of one to judge the authenticity of the other.  
 Keller’s omission here is not necessarily bad, nor does it invalidate his arguments by any 
means. His focus on one position may certainly be helpful, in that one can more thoroughly and 
accurately explain a single position if it is examined in isolation. Yet this approach is also 
limiting, as it completely removes an entire and salient perspective from the conversation. 
Respecting the gravity of this limitation, I intend to elucidate the fallacies of both extremes of the 
present debate. Any argument that rejects the inherent compatibility of religion and science, 
regardless of the discipline it favors, is flawed and distorts, on some level, what precisely science 
and religion are. By the same token, it stands to reason that science and religion need not 
necessarily imply each other; they are not, so to speak, “two sides of one coin.” Religions are 
functionally and essentially philosophical systems, and one may elect to endorse some atheistic 
philosophical worldview, which is no more or less compatible with science than any religious 
tradition. Although one may not marshal scientific evidence to disprove a religious claim, one 
philosophical claim may, by all means, contend with another.  
7 
 
 More specifically, I will demonstrate in this essay that the historical conflict between 
science and religion is an “irresponsible hyperbole,” as one author has termed it,5 that has been 
unnecessarily, arbitrarily and artificially created and exacerbated because of a general 
misunderstanding of the definition and domain of each term. In order to illustrate this, I will 
begin by briefly summarizing the developmental histories of science and religion, as well as the 
conflict between them. After documenting the evolution of these two systems, I will present data 
that demonstrates that their usage in modern arguments to advance notions of incompatibility has 
distorted them beyond historical recognition. The culmination of this latter section will be my set 
of guidelines for properly negotiating the compatibility of religion and science, so that one may 
avoid making inadvertent yet harmful distortions. Properly understood and employed, religion 
and science do not conflict with each other, and in fact make nice complements. 
 
A Brief Disclaimer 
 It cannot have escaped the reader that I am writing not only as a religious person but 
more particularly as a Protestant Christian. One, then, may fairly raise a question about my 
objectivity, as well as the broader applicability of my position to religious traditions other than 
my own. Sensitive to these valid concerns, I want to assure the reader of my firm commitment to 
presenting objective data, and to avoiding overemphasizing the flaws of atheistic dismissals of 
religion to the neglect of equally flawed theistic dismissals of science. Furthermore, my thesis is 
not simply that Christianity is compatible with science, but that all religions are so. At the same 
time, the reader should understand that it is not possible for any author to fully avoid a degree of 
internal bias, even if negligible. It is my every intent to employ the utmost academic integrity in 
this essay, yet let the reader not be troubled if the personality of the author comes through. 
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II. A Brief History of the Conflict between Science and Religion 
There have always been people, in every age and in each tradition, who have fought the 
modernity of their day. 
– Karen Armstrong, The Battle For God1 
 
 Prima facie, this section may seem tangential to the discussion at hand. However, taking 
stock of the evolution of science of religion, separately and collectively, will provide invaluable 
insight needed to reconcile religion and science in the third chapter. A necessary prerequisite for 
the incompatibility of these two disciplines is their essential, static rigidity. If this is so, and if we 
are to understand these two terms according to our modern, post-Enlightenment Euro-American 
hermeneutic, then they may indeed be in irresolvable conflict. However, the histories of science, 
religion, and their relatively new rivalry, show that the meanings of these terms are not static, but 
constantly being refined and reworked, as the cultures that define them develop internally and 
communicate with each other externally.2 Examining these histories will demonstrate the 
limitations of relying on a purely twenty-first century Western understanding of science and 
religion, which I will argue helps precipitate the unnecessary conflict between religion and 
science. Doing so prior to a discussion on how a marriage of science and religion may be 
workable will frame that discussion more appropriately. 
 
A History of Science 
 We often associate terms like “science” and “technology” with Enlightenment and 
Modern advancements and ideas. However, even a cursory history of science like this reveals 
that this simply is not the case. The origin of scientific thinking cannot be located in any 
particularly moment or point in space. Humans have been collecting and applying knowledge of 
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the world around them since the dawn of humanity, and to varying and highly culturally-
dependent extents. Though there is an inevitable exchange of technology and information as 
civilizations interact with each other, history shows that prior to the Colonial Period, when 
Eurocentric ideas (including Enlightenment and Modernist ideals) were largely inculcated to the 
rest of the world, individual cultures displayed rather idiosyncratic engagements with science. 
What I mean by this is that all civilizations experience their own “Dark Ages,” “Renaissances,” 
“Ages of Enlightenment,” and so on, which may not occur simultaneously across cultures. For 
example, the Medieval Period was a “Dark Age” for Europe, but a veritable “Enlightenment” for 
much of the Islamic world. What will become apparent to the reader is how the demonstrable 
relativity of science detracts from spurious and thoughtless claims that the true meaning of 
science is found only in a post-Enlightenment world and defined by Western Modernist norms.  
 As already mentioned, the peoples of the great potamic civilizations of the ancient world 
were prodigious scientists, making a number of mathematical, medical, astronomical and 
otherwise scientific discoveries that would not be known to Europe (or in some cases, lost to 
Europe after the fall of Rome) for hundreds or even thousands of years.3 Shepherd lists more 
than fifty significant scientific discoveries and achievements before the advent of Thales of 
Miletus, regarded by many (including Aristotle) as the first European philosopher.4 Only five of 
these are made by Europeans, while the rest are made by various geographically diffuse ancient 
inhabitants of Egypt, China, India, and Mesopotamia.  
 Thales of Miletus, the first Greek in recorded history to try to understand the world by 
observation (as opposed to myth and superstition), introduced a wave of scientific engagement in 
Europe5 which would eventually spread from Greece to Italy, and from there to much of Western 
and Southern Europe and the Mediterranean via Roman conquest. The products of the ensuing 
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Classical Period include such titans of Western scholarship as Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Euclid, 
Archimedes, Galen, Hippocrates, and dozens of others. Tellingly, however, there was never a 
consensus among the exceptional thinkers of the Classical Period of what precisely counts as 
legitimate knowledge. Aristotle and Epicurus, siding with Thales, argued that truth about the 
world must be empirically determinable. Parmenides, Socrates and Plato all thought that truth 
could only be found in logic and reason, and decidedly not by empirical study. Pliny the Elder’s 
exhaustive compendium on all known knowledge, Historia Naturalis, included works of magic.6 
Ironically, the more philosophers tried to uncover the true nature of the world, the more obscure 
that nature became. 
 As the Roman Empire began to disintegrate throughout the fifth century of the Common 
Era, Europe’s biggest and most productive intellectual centers faltered, and Europe entered into a 
Dark Age where few meaningful scientific advancements were made. However, as Europe 
languished in academic darkness, a new cultural, intellectual and religious movement swept 
across the Near East, Southwest Asia, Northern Africa, and even parts of Spain. The Islamic 
empires of the Medieval Period underwent a sort of “Enlightenment” period a millennium prior 
to the eponymous event in Europe. In addition to their own contributions to mathematics, 
astronomy, medicine and the arts, they collected, preserved, annotated, criticized and even added 
to the works of Classical thinkers.7 Again, unsurprisingly at this point, we see that Medieval 
Islamic academics disagreed over what could qualify as knowledge. In addition to opposing 
parties of Aristotelians and Platonists, belief in the veracity of astrological and alchemical 
procedures was ubiquitous.8 Despite contributing immensely to humanity’s corpus of knowledge, 
even these thinkers could not agree on the criteria for determining truth.  
 As the Medieval period wound down, Europe’s former fixation with scholarship returned,  
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laying the groundwork for the intellectual magnates of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment. 
During this period, Aristotelian empiricism grew increasingly popular in European academic 
circles, largely thanks to theologian-scientists like Roger Bacon and William of Occam.9 The 
idea that empiricism is equivalent to scientific truth became virtually standard in European elite 
academic circles by the Enlightenment, and a fascination with the observation of the world 
precipitated such an explosion of technological and scientific advancement arguably not matched 
since the great Pre-Classical potamic cultures. It is worth noting that many of the most profound 
scientific discoveries in Europe between the Medieval Period and the Modern Period were made 
by devout Christians, including those by Galileo, Newton, Mendel, Darwin and others. 
Concurrently, Europe’s incredible military prowess, facilitated largely by their new-
found technological superiority, allowed them to explore and colonize vast swaths of territory 
across the globe. The young, tenacious and resource-rich United States followed suit after 
winning its independence from its own European colonial ruler. While it is an overstatement to 
say that all peoples of the world became subject to Euro-American powers – just as it is ignorant 
to claim that Europe and America were alone in practicing colonialism – it is a historical reality 
that the dominant global powers for most of the latter half of the second millennium CE were 
localized in Europe and America.  
In the aftermath of the world wars, colonialism began to fall out of favor as discrete 
people-groups were either freely granted nation-states by their former colonizers, or won them 
through war or organized resistance movements. Though the globe has now fractured into scores 
of independent states, many would argue that American and European dominance is still, if 
tacitly, in force. Even overlooking their constant military and economic intervention, the 
imperative of the rest of the world to modernize to match the academic and economic stature of 
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Euro-America is readily apparent. Though the Colonial Period may have technically ended, in its 
wake the world is remaking itself in the image of Europe and America. 
 The substance of this image, at least as it relates to academia, amounts to an ad absurdum 
extension of the brand of scientific empiricism standardized during the Enlightenment. This was 
largely a reaction to competing religious and secular philosophical systems that held that relying 
on empiricism alone could provide only limited insight on reality. Evans demonstrates that post-
Darwinian anti-religious scientists intentional exaggerated the disparity between science and 
religion in order to elevate the status of science by juxtaposing it against a ridiculous strawman 
of religion.10 He writes further: 
The motivation for promoting metaphysical naturalism [in sociology] was a combination 
of the personal anti-religiosity of the founders [of sociology] and the need to draw very 
strong intellectual boundaries against the competing group of religious social gospel 
sociologists. By delegitimizing religious belief writ large, this latter faction could be 
convincingly defeated and sociology could be a "science," given that natural scientists, 
with their naturalistic assumptions, controlled what was considered to be legitimate 
knowledge in universities.11 
In fairness, the empiricists’ concerns were valid. The findings of Copernicus, Galileo and 
Darwin were all reviled by the religious leaders of the day, and many Christians continue to deny 
scientifically verified facts like biological evolution and the multi-billion year age of the earth, 
on the grounds that they contradict scriptural truth.12 Even more inflaming has been their 
perception that religious people draw their information about the world from subjective, 
unverifiable and fundamentally unscientific sources, as if to subjugate science to conjecture. 
Empiricists, then, began to see religion as a direct challenge to science. In response to this 
challenge, they unwittingly adapted their understanding of science from a strictly empirical 
discipline to more of an epistemological system13 (epistemology is the branch of philosophy 
concerned with how to properly discern and acquire knowledge). Science became the only valid 
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means by which one can definitively understand anything. This is an enormously significant 
development which has defined the present debate between religion and science. Moreland 
convincingly argues that scientism – this epistemological approach to science – has so pervaded 
modern Western society that it has become “the intellectual and cultural air we breathe.”14 This 
is where we find ourselves today: a world in which claims are treated as flatly wrong until 
scientifically verified. It is a world where philosophical systems, including religion, are rejected 
out of hand as outmoded fictions, and “the only ‘natural laws’ are the laws of physics, chemistry, 
and biology, working blindly and without purpose.”15 In Chapter III we will work through the 
fallacies of modern scientism and its categorical and rather unscientific dismissal of religion. 
 
A History of Religion 
 Before a discussion of the history of religious thought and behavior may be had, the 
reader must first understand that the entire category of “religion” is inherently subjective and 
difficult to define. Many attempts to define religion by specific, inflexible criteria fail to apply 
broadly to everything which we would like to classify as “religion.” This fact is due largely to 
the historical context behind the development and usage of the term. Our understanding of 
religion, historically and a contemporarily, is directly and inexorably tied to a specific historical 
and cultural context which has had disproportionated influence over how we understand it today. 
As Islamic scholar, Carl Ernst, puts it: 
The term came into existence at a certain time for certain purposes, and its meaning has 
changed significantly over the years. Although it may be tempting to regard major 
concepts such as religion as being universal and applicable in all times and places, they 
are, in fact, historically conditioned and depend on particular circumstances. We cannot 
understand religion in a timeless sense or through an abstract definition. Religion can be 
understood only with respect to context: we have to understand the actors, the time, the 
place, and the issues in order to avoid making serious mistakes.16  
14 
 
The “serious mistake” from which Ernst means to spare us is the fiction that our modern 
Eurocentric understanding of religion is shared by every culture and religious tradition. How one 
elects to define or characterize religion may not be (and often is not) the same as the choice of 
another. Our understanding of the term today is a decidedly novel one, tied inseparably to 
Modernist and Enlightenment ideals. This is because its roots lie in Europe, where it evolved 
alongside Christianity, later to be propagated around the globe by European Christian colonizers 
and missionaries.17 As with our discussion of the evolution of scientific thought, what follows 
will elucidate the problem with defining religion only according to modern conceptions of it.  
 The English word “religion” is a corruption of a Latin loanword, “religio,” which itself is 
probably taken from an earlier Latin word, like “relegere” or “religare.” Relegere means “to 
read multiple times” or “ to meticulously repeat,” and religare means “to bind”.18 Accordingly, 
the Latin religio carried a sense of dutiful and regular effort toward something to which one has 
committed oneself, a connotation it retained when it was Anglicized as religion. “Religion,” 
then, is an appropriate term for the practices of the Greco-Roman polytheists and Christians who 
originally adopted it, as their central religious practices at that time revolved around such 
personal and regular demonstrations of association with the divine. From this understanding 
comes the enduring notion that religion is concerned chiefly with maximizing beneficial action 
and perfecting proper practice.19 
  It is worth noting that the connotation of religio is very different from terms indigenous  
to other religious traditions that are rendered “religion” in English. The two best examples are 
the terms din in Islam and dharma in Hinduism and related traditions (e.g. Buddhism). When 
searching for an Islamic analogue to the Euro-Christian religion, interpreters and translators turn 
to the Arabic din, which denotes, depending on the situation, either “religion” or “reckoning.”20 
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Even translated as “religion,” however, din does not carry the same meaning as religio, for the 
former is derived from an earlier Arabic word, dāna, which connotes a sense of indebtedness, 
paid by adherence to divine instructions.21 Din, then, fits perfectly within an Islamic theological 
framework – for the Arabic islam, simply means “submission” – but does not align precisely 
with the Christian-minded religio. Similarly, the Sanskrit dharma, the analogue for “religion” for 
a number of Indian religious traditions including Hinduism and Buddhism, cannot be properly 
rendered into English without much being lost in translation. Dharma is the state of being 
entirely in harmony with ṛta, the transcendent cosmic order.22 “Religio” does not even begin to 
capture the depth and complexity of dharma’s multifaceted meaning.  
  That our modern universal terminology for referring to the sacred spheres of life does not 
fit well outside a Euro-Christian hermeneutic reveals a significant fact about the history of 
religion, which is that the way we think about religion is hopelessly entangled with European 
thinking, which was inculcated to the rest of the world through European colonialism. Of course, 
before the term emerged activity that we would characterize as “religious” existed practically 
universally across human cultures. Nevertheless, it is critical to emphasize that the world’s 
understanding of what it means to be “religious” has been 1) historically relative and dependent 
on the relevant cultural standards particular to each people-group, and 2) subject to change in 
order to accord with the dominant cultural influence in a given region – namely, Europe, for the 
last few centuries.  
 An excellent proof of this can be found by tracing the development of the subtle nuances  
religio takes as major ideological shifts occur  in Europe. To reiterated an earlier point, when it 
first emerged, religio referred to the practices and attitudes of Roman polytheists. In this age, 
“religion” was most often understood pluralistically because it was typically a subjective and 
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private experience.23 In its original sense, there were not distinct definable “religions” as we 
know of today, apart from each person’s own idiosyncratic effort to live virtuously and please 
the gods. This is not to say that there were not commonly practiced, even standardized, myths 
and rituals which would have been normative to many people within a tradition, but rather that 
there existed greater operational flexibility and liberty within that tradition than was common 
during other periods. 
 When Christianity supplanted traditional polytheism as Rome’s dominant religious 
system, the usage of “religion” changed slightly. The term referred to essentially the same events 
and practices, with the exception that it is now only a singular term.24 It would not be proper in 
the early centuries of Roman Christendom to refer to multiple religions, because any religion 
other than that of the Papacy was regarded as a mere distortion of the “true religion.” In other 
words, there was a right way to “do” religion (namely, Christianity as taught by Church elites), 
and a wrong way to “do” religion (namely, any other religious practice, whether adherence to 
non-Christian religions, unauthorized Christian traditions or no religion at all). 
 The policy of regarding “religion” as a singular entity needed to be revised following the 
Protestant Reformation. It is no accident that this paradigm shift coincided with the European 
Enlightenment. All across Europe, well-educated elites, weary of the violent divisiveness and 
persecution that characterized Catholic and Protestant practice immediately following the 
Reformation, initiated a general movement toward liberal ideology centered around 
individualism and the privacy of philosophical choice (including religion). Despite an initial 
impulse to categorize each other as false corruptions of the True Religion, the various Christian 
denominations which emerged from the Reformation came to accept each other as essentially 
true and therefore acceptable.25 With the shift that “religion” could legitimately refer to multiple 
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traditions, Christians began to redefine and expand the term to include non-Christian traditions. 
Although conceptions of “religion” were at first still normative and held Christian traditions 
alone as purporting “truth,” non-Christian traditions were now considered valid, if untruthful, 
categories of religion. Gradually, as the liberal Enlightenment ideals of tolerance, privacy and 
individualism inculcated ever deeper into the Euro-American culture – as well as those within 
their spheres of influence, which at one point was practically the entire world – the notion that 
one religion could be “right” and another “wrong” disappeared (at least at the state level), 
replaced by the novel ideal of the separation of church and state.  
Consequently, religious belief has been relegated to the realm of the subjective. In the 
interest of avoiding interreligious conflict by inciting offense, Euro-American culture has 
presently adopted an agnostic and relativistic approach to religion. It is no longer proper to 
classify religious information as knowledge, but rather it must be designated as opinion.26 The 
history from which this policy emerged demonstrates, as I have shown, that it reflects not only a 
very plain political motive, but also decidedly Post-Enlightenment and Eurocentric values. As I 
will illustrate in the following sections, it is the shift to this understanding of religion that has 
precipitated the artificial and wholly unnecessary conflict between religion and science. A return 
to the paradigm that religious knowledge cannot be disqualified as legitimate knowledge by 
science would effectively mitigate this conflict in the future. 
 
The Conflict in Context   
 Before laying out a brief sketch of a very real history of conflict, let me reiterate that 
conflict between religion and science, historically speaking, is very much the exception and not 
the rule. The ancients, certainly, seldom saw empirical study of the universe to preclude religious 
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or supernatural observances. Even the conviction that the natural world should be studied 
rationally and empirically did not require the rejection of the existence of the supernatural, as 
Epicurus, Pythagoras and others demonstrate.27 Moreover, Armstrong argues that the ancients 
categorized knowledge into two discrete yet equally valid spheres: logos, or that which describes 
the world’s matter, and mythos, or that which describes the world’s meaning. Both were needed 
to understand life and neither could confirm nor contradict the either.28 Armstrong’s notions of 
logos and mythos will be revisited in Chapter III.  
As time progressed, history’s academics continued to see their religious and scientific 
convictions as fully compatible, from al-Tabari and Ibn Sina (Avicenna) in the Medieval Islamic 
world, to Paschal and Leibniz at the dawn of the European Enlightenment, to modern scientists 
like Srinivasa Ramanujan, Francis Collins, and Mir Masoom Ali. Scores of other examples could 
be marshalled. Of course, that many examples of religious scientists can be cited does not prove 
that compatibility was a ubiquitous sentiment, nor does it necessarily disprove contemporary 
claims of incompatibility. It does, however, demonstrate that countless highly distinguished and 
respected scholars across time and space have had no difficulty observing religious practices in 
spite of their academic accomplishments.  
Yet the preceding sections of this chapter clearly demonstrate that a very real conflict 
exists between religion and science in the modern world. Here the research referenced by Evans, 
a nonreligious sociologist seeking shed new light on the debate, is useful. He cites a study by 
Besley and Nisbet that shows that the vast majority (85%) of members of the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science believe that American public is very ignorant of 
scientific knowledge, much to the detriment of the country, and that the public should be 
educated in a particular way so that they see the world as the AAAS does.29 On the face of it, 
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there is not necessarily anything objectionable about this, but it does show that many scientists, 
ironically, have the same attitude of philosophical superiority regarding science that many 
religious conservatives have about their religion. Moreover, Evans cites the work of Ecklund and 
Scheitle regarding the way those with a stake in the debate perceive the relationship between 
science and religion. They found that fewer than one fifth of American Catholics and liberal 
Protestants, and fewer than one third of American Evangelicals, perceive conflict between the 
two, while more than half of nonreligious respondents perceive such conflict.30 These statistics 
are very telling. They show that a remarkable obstinance characterizes much of the non-religious 
empiricist community, while a willingness to collaborate intellectually characterizes much of the 
country’s religious population. 
 It is no secret that the Church at large has had a history of reacting strongly against what 
it perceives to be competing truth claims that may disparage its faith. At least since the Roman 
Empire became Christianized, the organized and henceforth politically powerful Church has 
often openly condemned, silenced, exiled, persecuted and executed those who failed to conform 
to accepted ideology.31 The schisms between Catholic and Orthodox Christians, and later 
between Catholic and Protestant Christians, resulted in massive bloodshed, as did various 
Crusades and inquisitions, all in the name of purging humanity of adherents to faulty doctrine. A 
succession of smaller-scale acts of religious terror are, wearingly, becoming increasingly 
common, including, most recently, a disturbing attack on a New Zealand mosque by a white 
supremacist on March 15, 2019.32 Of course, history is also full of examples of religiously 
motivated violence performed by non-Christians, as well as atheistic or non-religious powers. A 
good example is the mihna, a ninth century Abbasid event which Esack (employing a bit of 
scholarly liberty) compares to the Spanish Inquisition.33 Muslim theologians subjected to the 
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mihna were required by the Caliph to profess particular ontological beliefs about the Qur’an, and 
those who refused were persecuted and often killed.34 
 My point here is that by the end of the Medieval Period, religious institutions had already 
developed a history of contentiously disputing with competing intellectual systems based on 
accepted points of fact. This contentious attitude was on full display when this sort of conflict 
occurred between Christian religious institutions and Renaissance and Enlightenment scientists 
like Copernicus and Galileo. When Darwin’s work demonstrated that biological evolution is a 
scientific fact, further and more enduring conflict ensued between proponents of science and 
religion, especially Christians, many of whom saw Darwinism as a direct attack on the Creation 
accounts in the Bible’s Book of Genesis.  
Interestingly, in the nineteenth century, American Christians were quite amenable with 
science. Science was considered by educated religious people very compatible with religion, and 
was understood to confirm religious claims made by Jews and Christians.35 Indeed the two were 
regarded as two sides of the same coin. Theology studied the supernatural and science the 
natural, all part of God's creation. Part of this amenability was due to the development of an 
approach to science developed by Sir Francis Bacon. This so-called "Baconian method" was 
extremely compatible with unjustifiable religious claims, as it stressed the crucialness of 
observation and would therefore not reject a claim which could not be observed to be false.36 
Instead, it would resort to agnosticism on the issue and allow other sources which could evaluate 
the merit of the unobservable assume authority. This supports nicely the dominant view of 
Protestants at the time, that religion and science were discretely divided into separate categories 
of truth, each to be examined independently, and both able to contribute to humanity’s vault of 
knowledge. This approach facilitated a considerable degree of harmony between scientific and 
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religious beliefs, especially among liberal American Protestants. This lasted until until the early 
1900s, when atheistic empiricists successfully expelled religion from academic institutions by 
discrediting the Baconian principles that any observation from any person, if justifiable, has 
scientific merit, as mentioned earlier.   
 Their success at rendering science and religion irreconcilable based on conflicting claims 
of fact has led to the development and propagation to the point of ubiquity of philosophical 
scientism among the West’s cultural and academic elites, as Moreland and Evans both show.37 
Now, religious conservatives are set up as the opponents of science, therefore justifying their 
ridicule and discredit by nonreligious empiricists. Though it is a demonstrable fact that many 
religious conservatives do indeed dispute a number of specific scientific claims (recall earlier 
references to Armstrong and Evans), Evan’s data cited earlier in this section demonstrates that 
for the vast majority of religious Americans, even conservatives, their claim is not that the 
entirety of science is invalidated by religion, but that, if anything, only a few claims of fact are 
disproven by scriptural sources. Recall that it is primarily the nonreligious empiricists who are 
assert incompatibility, and that many of their claims about religiously-minded Americans are 
strawmen that unduly discredit religious thinking. Evans explains the conflict this way: 
It has long been claimed that one source of conflict between science and society is the 
religious citizens who are inevitably in conflict with science. They are so, the narrative 
continues, because they are opposed to scientific claims, since religion has a different 
way of knowing facts about the world. The common conception is that religion ultimately 
determines truths about the natural world through supernatural revelation and science 
ultimately determines truth through observation and reason.38   
He continues: 
That some Protestant fundamentalists do not believe scientists’ accounts of the age of the 
Earth really is not the problem, but pretending that it is is comforting for scientists, 
because it keeps the debate on the scientists’ turf of facts.39 
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Moreland assents: 
The shift from the ideas that there are several ways of knowing and that theology, science 
and other fields provide us with genuine knowledge, to the acceptance of scientism . . . 
was not made on the basis of arguments, facts and discoveries that laypeople just didn’t 
know about yet. Rather, it was merely a pragmatic sociological shift. (italics original)40 
The history of the debate between religion and science, therefore, can be reduced to a 
relatively recent innovation, originated and exacerbated by elites on both sides. It neither reflects 
the perceptions of the vast majority of humans across time nor space nor accurately portrays 
science or religion. The purpose of this innovation was to misrepresent the terms of the debate to 
favor the dispositions of a select few who directly benefit from the supremacy of one over the 
other. This, obviously, does humanity a great disservice by subjecting generations to conflict and 
vitriol based on entirely spurious and self-serving grounds. In the next chapter, I will properly 
reframe science and religion and show how the two are inherently compatible, as well as what 
compatibility does and does not indicate.   
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III. Reframing the Debate 
 I would estimate that about 95% of science and religion are cognitively irrelevant to each other. 
– J.P. Moreland, Scientism and Secularism1 
 
 On the face of it, at least two challenges may be fairly levied against my arguments at this 
point: 1) if the histories of science and religion show that the definition of each term is entirely 
context-dependent and constantly evolving, how can I present a definition of these terms (which 
could be seen as another stage in their respective evolutionary chains) that disqualifies another 
definition; and, assuming that I can legitimately present such a definition 2) would not mine be 
another example of the sort of Eurocentric Post-Enlightenment interpretation that I attempt to 
discredit (as I am an American descended from Europeans who lives after the Enlightenment)? 
These are fair and deserve my attention.  
First, by no means do I claim that I have authority to make some sort of definitive 
judgement that denies the interpretations of others. Nor do I want to advance my own opinion as 
the only way to understand science and religion, thereby making them statically definable terms. 
However, the research I have presented in Chapter II demonstrates that the way we currently 
understand the disciplines of science and religion has been imposed on them from external 
sources. Religious (especially European Christian) elites have for centuries cast authentic, 
verifiable scientific discoveries as corrupted and pernicious fictions, out of sync with religiously 
authoritative sources. They thereby attempt to subsume science into a religious hermeneutic and 
define science on terms set not by it but by the religious hegemony. Reciprocally, scientific 
elites, especially since the acceptance of Darwinian evolution, have portrayed religious thinking 
and activity as superfluous, retrograde and categorically irrelevant. In doing so, they frame 
religion on scientific terms, as a mode of fact-collection, vaguely resembling, but hopelessly 
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methodologically inferior to, science. This effort by some scientists likewise attempts to subsume 
religion by granting science authority on both scientific and, implicitly, philosophical matters. 
To the second potential charge, I would respond that my location in time and space, 
which I cannot control and from which I cannot be divorced, is largely irrelevant in this instance. 
Neither the reasoning I employ nor the position I advance is rooted in or reflective of the 
predominant attitude disseminated by mostly Post-Enlightenment Euro-American thinkers to 
much of the rest of the world via Colonial (and similar Post-Colonial) channels. This attitude has 
been held by religious and scientific elites for at least the couple centuries following the end of 
the Enlightenment, and has been characterized by a general rejection of any kind of compatibility 
that allows the two to be entirely intellectually reconciled. It is because I argue that just such a 
configuration of compatibility is rationally possible that I claim that my perspective can be 
separated, at least in part, from my cultural and temporal context, and located instead in that of 
my sources, and their sources, etc.. What follows is my justification for my claim that religion 
and science cannot be rendered incompatible. 
 
Reframing Science 
 It may be easy to assume that a paper like this will be prone to making unfounded attacks 
against scientific reasoning, especially considering the religious disposition of the author. I hope 
that by this point it is apparent that this is decidedly not my position. I fully recognize the 
veracity of science, as well as its authority to explain and describe natural phenomena just as 
much as I recognize that of religion to do the same for supernatural phenomena (e.g. the genesis 
of the universe, which is impossible to explain using science). 
Science is an authority on reality in itself. It collects knowledge from observation and  
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careful study, grounded in the axiom that what can be shown to be true is true. The use of this 
tautology may be somewhat silly, but the reality that scientific facts are disputed by some 
because of alleged conflict with religious claims calls for such deliberately, if excessively, 
meticulous treatment. If I can observe the occurrence of some phenomenon, then I can know 
with absolute certainty that it has occurred. It has happened and I know that to be true. Yet my 
unsupported account of its occurrence does not make it true, and provides no objective reason for 
others to believe that it occurred at all. However, if I can demonstrate its occurrence publicly and 
repeatedly, then it can be definitively proven true; it has been documented too many times to 
deny its existence. This is why scientific findings are authoritative. Science does not create, it 
only records observations.   
This system of subjecting a hypothesis (an unproven statement of fact) to thorough 
examination and experimentation has been expounded upon and codified as a formal process 
called the Scientific Method. The Scientific Method is the standard against which all hypotheses 
are verified or refuted. Science, therefore, is perfectly equipped to study and explain everything 
that can possibly be observed with predictable repetition. Many religious conservatives refuse to 
admit it, but biological evolution and the multibillion year age of the earth have been thoroughly 
and conclusively proven to be true by this method, and therefore are factual beyond any doubt. 
There is no way to rationally argue against this, except by speculating that these conclusions 
have somehow misapplied the Scientific Method. If an event or idea can be scientifically proven 
then it is indisputably true.     
Once again, science is an authority on reality in itself. Yet it cannot not be the final 
authority on reality. This may sound jarring to a Post-Enlightenment audience taught to believe 
in the authenticity of what many, like Moreland, call “scientism.” We’ve dealt with this term a 
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little in Chapter II, but here it will be further explored. Moreland, a Protestant theologian and a 
trained chemist, defines scientism as “the view that the hard sciences alone have the intellectual 
authority to give us knowledge of reality.”2 Despite its overwhelming prevalence in popular 
culture, it is undone using rather nonstrenuous reasoning. Three strong lines of reasoning 
demonstrate the fallacious nature of scientism, and therefore the limitations of relying on science 
alone to provide all knowledge. These are the facts that: 1) there are certain aspects of reality 
(which I take to refer to that which objectively true, whether observable or not. Implied in this 
definition is the possibility that some things may not be provable or even comprehendible. Yet 
some things may be perfectly cogent, yet simply beyond the scope of what science can 
understand but not beyond the scope of what other disciplines can understand, as we will see) 
which science is insufficient to explain; 2) there are modes of reasoning that produce definitive 
truth without relying the Scientific Method; and 3) scientism is inherently self-contradictory.  
Moreland describes Richard Swinburne’s two categories of information which the 
Scientific Method is wholly incapable of studying: things that are too odd for science to explain, 
and things that are too big for science to explain.3 The first category has several forms, the first 
of which includes events that do not follow the laws which should describe it, such that those 
laws must be revised to the point that they are ad hoc and ridiculous. He cites a number of 
examples of patients who recovered from severe medical conditions (e.g. physical deformity, 
loss of higher brain function, etc.) contrary to the prognosis of physicians – what nonreligious 
people would call medical anomalies and religious people would call miracles.4 Of course, that a 
few diffuse cases exist that do not behave as medical science might predict in no way confirms 
the suspicion of some religious people that the cause of recovery was divine intervention, but 
they do present cases where events have occurred that are inexplicable by scientific means.  
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The second form of events that science cannot explain includes those which, in order to 
be described on scientific grounds, require an absurd number of correlations to make them 
feasible. The example Moreland uses for this form is the effort of some researches to connect 
events that occur in the physical organ of the brain with conscious experiences. He remarks that  
attempting to create definitive neuroscientific laws that show how neurological events lead to 
emotional or psychological conditions necessitates “an unruly list of hundreds of thousands, 
maybe millions, of brute-fact correlations between various mental and physical states,” rendering 
it “so utterly complex that the theory itself would be undermined.”5 He uses this same example 
to show another instance where phenomena cannot be described scientifically, which is when 
they are by nature contingent, rather than under the operation of some natural law. Scientific 
laws describe events that are not contingent. They are predictable consequences of antecedent 
events – consequences which must always and unconditionally occur. There is no causal reason, 
however, to explain why certain consequent mental states correspond to particular antecedent 
brain states, making that correspondence indemonstrable using science.6  
 The final form of events too odd for science to explain involve unprecedented incidents 
that are so unlike any other phenomenon that they cannot be predicted by science. Moreland. 
illustrates this by citing the emergence of human consciousness. He points out that: 
According to scientism, the entire history of the universe was a history of strictly physical 
entities until the very first sentient beings evolved, and prior to the appearance of these 
beings, there were no sensations thoughts desires, and so forth. And the appearance of 
consciousness was utterly unpredictable from even exhaustive God-like knowledge of 
brute matter.7 
 
The second broad category of phenomena unexplainable to science – that which is too big 
for science to explain – is much narrower, and includes that which is inexplicable by scientific 
means “in principle,” i.e., events of such monumental cosmic proportion that humans cannot 
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observe or empirically study them.8 He lists five examples of such phenomena: the origin of the 
universe, the origin of scientific laws, the origin of consciousness, the fine-tuning of the 
universe, and what he calls “objectively true laws in morality, rationality and aesthetics.”9 Even 
disregarding the fifth item on this list – which perhaps uses the term “objectively” with a degree 
of liberality inappropriate for a scholar – Moreland leaves the reader with little doubt that some 
things are indeed unknowable with the use of only science.  
 The second weakness of scientism is the fact that science is demonstrably not the only 
method of obtaining authentic knowledge. Mathematics, logic, philosophy, forensics, testimony 
and personal experience are all legitimate sources of knowledge which cannot be acquired by 
applying the Scientific Method. To those who have never thought critically about mathematics, 
my designation of it as unscientific may be confusing, given that it and science are often grouped 
together. However, a fundamental difference exists between their respective natures, which is 
that scientific truths are grounded in repeated observation, while mathematical truths are 
grounded in axiomatic statements. A mathematical calculation is more like deductive reasoning 
than a scientific experiment.  
Take for example, the algebraic equation 5 + x = 9. To solve this equation for the 
unknown value x using scientific experimentation, one would need to repeatedly observe 
instances of various values being added to the number 5, and compare the sums again and again 
to the number 9 to determine if equality had occurred. After exhaustive tests, one might conclude 
that when the value of the number 4 is added to the value of the number 5, the sum is equal to the 
value of the number 9. However, there would be no way to determine if other solutions are 
possible, because the absence of data is not sufficient to rule out a possibility without the 
presence of positively refuting data. 
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Using deductive reasoning based on axiomatic statements, however, leads to the same 
solution (which we all know to be true), but with greater simplicity and definitude. Because 
Euclid’s third axiom tells us that a pair of equal values subtracted from another pair of equal 
values yields a new pair of equal values, we can say with certainty that 5 + x – (5) = 9 – (5). The 
subtraction of the same value (5) from both sides of the equation does not falsify the equation. 
That equation can then be simplified to x = 4, a definite solution produced by intrinsically 
unscientific, but categorically legitimate, means. Unlike the laborious, cumbersome scientific 
approach, the use of mathematical axioms requires no research nor collection of data. We know 
intuitively that they are true simply because truth is their essential nature. Philosophy and logic 
are also based on axioms, and can similarly be shown to derive truth unscientifically. 
Forensic disciplines like history and archaeology provide additional examples of sources 
of legitimate knowledge that operate independently of the Scientific Method. They must do so, 
of necessity, as events that have happened in the past are not repeatable, and therefore can no 
longer be verified by observation and empirical study. That is not to say that two separate events 
cannot resemble each other (i.e. that history cannot “repeats itself"), but that they can never be 
identical. The Indianapolis Colts might win a second Super Bowl, (so history may “repeat 
itself”), but even if it is in Miami and against the Chicago Bears, it would axiomatically be a 
different event than Super Bowl XLI (in 2007). This somewhat silly example reveals a very real 
issue for proponents of scientism, which is that if scientism is correct, the existence of historical 
places, events, ideas and individuals cannot be taken as facts, because they are not repeatable and 
therefore not empirically verifiable. If scientism is correct, then it is not possible to prove that, 
say, Charles Darwin ever existed, nor that he authored On the Origin of Species, nor even that his 
paradigm-altering study of finches in the Galapagos actually took place. Ruling out the testimony 
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of witnesses provides similar issues. The facts that forensic data and eyewitness testimonies are 
considered admissible evidence in courts of law is a very strong proof that science cannot be 
seen as the only authentic source of knowledge. 
If however, these first two lines of reasoning are somehow unconvincing, the third should  
conclusively discredit scientism: scientism is intrinsically a self-defeating system. Moreland 
gives three criteria to determine if a statement is self-refuting: 1) the statement includes a 
mechanism for determining truth; 2) the statement can be tested by that mechanism; and 3) the 
statement is proven by its own mechanism to be false.10 These three criteria are demonstrably 
applicable to scientism. Scientism makes a statement about how to determine truth, namely that a 
claim can only be true if empirically verifiable; it can be tested by this mechanism, because it 
claims to truthful; finally the mechanism it provides proves itself to be false, because the veracity 
of scientism is not empirically determinable. It is an epistemological activity, not a scientific one, 
for no amount of observation or study will ever be able to objectively prove its principle claims. 
These proofs must come from philosophical debates. Scientism proves itself to be false, and 
therefore its claim that science is the only way to verify truth-claims cannot possibly be true. 
Conclusions made through systematic and empirical examination and experimentation 
can be trusted beyond all doubt. Unsupported allegations that provable scientific facts are false 
can be dismissed out of hand. Those who make such allegations misunderstand science, wrongly 
believing it to be incompatible with religious beliefs. However, it is also a verifiable fact that 
science alone is wholly insufficient to explain and describe all knowledge. Proponents of 
scientism misunderstand the nature of science just as much as religious conservatives who 
attempt to refute scientific facts. Taken with a proper understanding of religion, this approach to 
determining what science is and is not will show how the two are inherently compatible.  
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Reframing Religion 
In the Fall of 2018, I and a couple friends were discussing sports via a social media group 
chat. I made what must have been a wildly ridiculous prediction (the substance of which I cannot 
recall), to which one friend, who is not religious, responded: “Blind faith is for religion, not 
sports.” His statement deeply puzzled me. I, a devout Christian, had never considered any 
component of my faith “blind” in any way. Nor do I now. My Christian faith is the result of 
accrued personal experiences that confirm to me the veracity of my faith and its truth-claims. 
This confirmation, naturally, is not something that can be scientifically verified or repeated, yet, 
simultaneously, it is something I can profess to be true for the very same reason that science 
cannot verify it: the nature of the data, which is personal experience. This reveals the principle 
strength of religious thinking, which is that religion can support modes of data that science 
cannot (the reverse is also true – science can support modes of data unintelligible to religion). 
 It is worth mentioning that Moreland notes that his five problems “too big” for science to 
explain are perfectly explainable with religion.11 Keller provides a list of what he calls “Clues of 
God,” which includes items very similar to Moreland’s examples: the Big Bang, the fine-tuning 
of the universe, the consistency of scientific laws of nature, and the existence and identifiability 
of innate beauty.12 Of course, Keller fully acknowledges that each “clue” of God’s existence is 
rationally avoidable, as well as the fact that the existence of Someone or Something we might 
call “God” in no way substantiates the beliefs of particular religious systems, like his own 
Presbyterian Christianity. However, Keller argues that the presence of so many compelling, if 
inconclusive, signs of God’s existence compared to the presence of shockingly few compelling 
arguments against God’s existence, makes it irrational to disbelieve in the existence of some 
transcendent Power, and ridiculous to dismiss it out of hand. His logic is persuasive, and yet the  
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prevailing paradigm still seems to be that religious belief is an act of irrational “blind faith.” 
What are the implications of describing religious faith as “blind?” Principally, it implies 
that the true nature of the world is imperceptible to religion. It betrays a belief that religion is 
fundamentally unequipped to explore truth, and therefore must rely on uncritical, thoughtless 
conjecture. While it would be ignorant to assert that no religious person has ever relied or 
espoused reliance on specifically blind faith, it is equally ignorant to say that reliance on such 
has been the dominant or even a significant paradigm throughout the history of religious thought. 
Religious people have a rich, time-tested history of not only theoretically claiming that their 
convictions are truthful, but also practically marshalling evidence to demonstrate their veracity.  
 Muslims, for example, argue that the Qur’an recited aloud in Arabic is so inimitably 
beautiful that it must be divine, and that many non-Muslims have converted to Islam simply after 
hearing the Qur’an.13 Muslims can readily evaluate and compare the aesthetic qualities of known 
human recitations against those of the Qur’an, and come to the conclusion that the former is no 
match for the latter. Indeed, the Qur’an itself declares that unbelievers “will not desist until the 
clear proof comes to them, a messenger from God reciting scriptures purified.”14 Clearly, these 
sources are not interested in conjecture, but in the collection and examination of data.  
Moreover, the authenticity of extra-Qur’anic texts considered authoritative sources of 
Islamic doctrine (these sources are called hadith in Arabic) is demonstrated by an incredibly 
systematic and thorough vetting process. This process consists of intensely scrutinizing every 
aspect of an account, and casting them into categories of reliability accordingly.15 This process is 
largely dependent on an assessment of the account’s isnad, or “chain of transmission.” The isnad 
of a hadith indicates through whom the recorder of the account came to hear of it. Before a 
hadith can be authoritatively certified as a probable and reliable account, it must be subjected to 
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a grueling examination of the people alleged in the isnad to have passed it on. Depending on the 
trustworthiness of each person in the chain, the plausibility of each transmissive connection and 
the degree to which the message was compatible with known revelations of Muhammad, the 
account could be systematically and convincingly demonstrated to be reliable or not. Thus, it is 
evidence of authenticity, not uncritical belief, that leads Muslims to accept religious doctrine. 
 The Bible provides additional examples of confessions of demonstrable proof of religious 
convictions. The Old Testament speaks continuously about God’s faithfulness – that is, God’s 
characteristic trustworthiness in fulfilling promises. Significantly, biblical writers who call on 
this attribute is frequently refer to previous instances where God has remained faithful as proofs 
that God will continue to be so, as in Psalm 106:21 and 1 Kings 8:56. In Malachi 3:10, God 
challenges the reader to test God’s faithfulness in providing for the physical needs of those who 
offer a portion of their wealth to the Temple. In the New Testament, the Pharisees demand 
miraculous signs from Jesus to prove his divine authority to challenge their interpretations of 
scripture and fierce debate ensues among them when they witness Jesus perform such miracles.16  
Throngs of people are often convinced of the authority of Jesus and his disciples only 
after a miracle is performed, and the disciple Thomas would only believe his fellows’ claim that 
Jesus had been resurrected from the dead after seeing Jesus alive with puncture marks in hands 
and feet to show that he had been crucified.17 Timothy Keller, a Presbyterian pastor, calls Jesus 
“the ultimate proof for the existence of God.”18 There is a reason Christians use jargon like 
“testimony” and “witness” to refer to their personal interaction with religious matters, which is 
that they understand these experiences to be authenticated by reliable, trustworthy eyewitnesses. 
Whether or not this seems intelligible outside a Christian context, it is clear that Christians have 
largely seen their religious beliefs as rational conclusions based on observation, and not  
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simpleminded “blind faith.” 
 Of course, none of this by any means proves that religious claims like those presented 
above are true. Proving them true is not the point, as we will see. What these do show is that 
religious people are not idiots who believe claims of fact without evidence, nor do they profess 
to do so. They don’t justify core convictions with speculation or transparently untrustworthy 
sources, but through carefully collected and analyzed evidence. Their convictions are seen as 
authentic, legitimate, verifiable truths.  
Taken to extreme proportions, this understanding of faith – that it involves referring to 
trustworthy sources for verifiable truth – can contribute to the tension between religion and 
science. Christians far too often treat the Bible as a history or science textbook, causing claims of 
fact to carry religious significance. When scientific evidence disagrees with these fact claims, it 
is taken as a challenge of the religion altogether. Mostly flowing from a commendable sense of 
trust in scriptural language, many religious conservatives push back all the more forcefully in the 
face of such challenges, devolving the conflict into an endless cycle.     
A different approach to religion, however, may be enough to interrupt this cycle. It has 
been sufficiently shown that the conflict between religion and science is a relatively recent 
innovation, brought about by misrepresentations of the two which have endured and more deeply 
inculcated these misconceptions. As Karen Armstrong puts it: 
Western civilization has changed the world. Nothing – including religion – can ever be 
the same again. All over the globe, people have been struggling with these new 
conditions and have been forced to reassess their religious traditions, which were 
designed for an entirely different type of society.19 
Recall Armstrong’s distinction between engagement with natural phenomena (logos) and 
engagement with supernatural phenomena (mythos). There is a clear discrepancy between the 
two, and they are not to be confused. As we have seen in the earlier section, “Reframing 
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Science,” myth cannot be proven false because there is no way to study it empirically to confirm 
the hypothesis that it is false. Myth is not the same as fiction. Yet, by the same token, myth 
cannot possibly be verified. There is simply no way to confirm that unrepeatable, unobservable 
events, even if true, ever took place. However, the veracity of myth is not the point; if it were, 
there would be no real difference between logos and mythos. Even if myth is insufficient to 
perform the function of science – namely, collecting knowledge of the natural world – science is 
equally insufficient to perform the function of myth – namely, giving meaning to the natural 
world, inaccessable when relying purely on empirical analysis.20  
The purpose of accounts like the Noachian Flood, or Muhammad’s Night Journey (Isra’) 
to Jerusalem, or the ancient war between Rama and Ravana is not to give literal accounts of 
historical events, but to convey and illustrate principles with tremendous philosophical (therefore 
outside the bounds of science) import. To treat them any other way is to not only to grossly 
misapply them, but also to strip them of their incredible value. If myth is fact, not meaning, from 
where are we supposed to find any semblance of significance? Meaning would be utterly 
indeterminable. To return to the earlier understanding of religion as myth – neither fact nor 
fiction, but something that transcends that dichotomy entirely – is to return the discipline of 
religion to its rightful place in life, where it can have real and inimitable value and exist in 
perfect harmony with scientific reasoning.  
 
Negotiating Compatibility  
 Recall that most of the conflict between the science and religion occurs when one of the 
two wrongfully encroaches on the domain of the other. We have seen, however, that religion and 
science, when done properly, perform fundamentally different functions, and therefore cannot be 
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legitimately applied beyond their respective fields of authority. The two simply do not study the 
same types of things, and therefore cannot in any way prove, disprove, affirm or attack the 
conclusions of the other. By their respective natures, they lack the methodological means to 
render such judgments of or against each other. It is on these grounds that I make my claim that 
science and religion are axiomatically compatible.  
 But it remains ambiguous what precisely it means that the two are compatible. Clearly, 
neither can validate nor invalidate the other – they can have no meaningful dialogue between 
each other, because they lack the means to understand each other. Therefore, it would be 
somewhat impetuous, even foolishly idealistic, to claim that science and religion are intrinsically 
and necessarily complimentary. Such a statement could be conclusively refuted by turning to 
examples of agnostics and atheists who are able to reconcile their personal, secular philosophical 
(and therefore empirically unprovable) convictions with science just as easily as theists should be 
able to reconcile their religious convictions with science. This ambiguity calls for a clarification 
of what exactly “compatibility” does and does not imply regarding science and religion. In this 
case, the data I have presented here demonstrate that there is no necessary 1) contradiction, 2) 
incorporation, or 3) contingency between the two. 
 The first has already been expounded upon with special thoroughness in this chapter. Yet, 
I will briefly summarize my earlier points for the sake of clarity. Science depends on observable 
data in order to reach conclusions, and cannot operate in the absence of such data. It is well 
suited to describe the natural, observable world, yet incapable of describing what can be known 
to be true but not conclusively and demonstrably verifiable. Religion, on the other hand, gives 
meaning to existence by appealing to that which science cannot comprehend. It transcends such 
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categories as fact and fiction – which are strictly within the realm of science – and therefore can 
neither be proven false nor true. 
 Once one accepts that religion and science are compatible, then it may be tempting 
compartmentalize one within the other. I will admit that in my experience the religious are more 
prone to committing this transgression than the nonreligious, typically following Augustine’s 
line of reasoning that “wherever truth may be found, it belongs to [the] Master.”21 Now, this is a 
perfectly acceptable perspective to take, and, being unverifiable, is not open to refutation by 
science. Yet those who profess this position must do so with caution. Tracing the root of all truth 
to a religious conviction is a philosophical statement, not a scientific one. Therefore, one may 
believe, along with Augustine, that God is the original source of all knowledge, but that cannot 
be mistaken as equivalent to subsuming science within religion. Regardless of the source of 
scientific truth (by nature a epistemological query, and not a scientific one), religion is still 
wholly unequipped to study the natural world in the way science can. Similarly, one cannot 
claim that religious truth can be subsumed by science. This would be tantamount to scientism, 
which was shown to be a self-defeating fallacy earlier in this chapter. Scholar of religion Wilfred 
Cantwell Smith calls religion “poetry plus, not science minus.”22 Religion is not reductionist 
science, nor is the reverse true. The sheer fact that science and religion study two discrete, 
nonintersecting bodies of knowledge means that one cannot be incorporated into the other.  
 The final potential erroneous conclusion I wish to dispel is that, if science and religion 
are compatible, then they must necessarily imply each other – in other words, that they are “two 
sides of a coin.” Compatibility may certainly lead one to that conclude that both are sources of 
truth – and that is definitively the position of the author – but it is critical to understand that this 
conclusion is not necessary. Compatibility does not mean contingency. It is perfectly rationally 
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coherent to live without embracing a particular religious tradition, as an endless cadre of 
agnostics and atheists will attest. Religion is really a form of philosophy. Everyone necessarily 
adheres to some sort of system of philosophical belief, even if they are unaware of it. They might 
refer to it as their “moral code” or “intuition” or “the way I was raised,” etc. Regardless of 
terminology, everyone conceptualizes the world in one way or another. Some of these we might 
designate as “secular” and others “religious.” Science and religion cannot necessitate each other, 
yet because there is no inherent conflict between them they are innately compatible.  
 In antiquity, mythos and logos were both regarded as indispensable, yet neither could 
subordinate the other  – “They had separate jobs to do.”23 There is no reason the same cannot be 
true today. Religion is not equipped to make scientific claims of fact, and so it should not. This 
does not mean that religion should be treated as false. Not only are atheistic caricatures of 
religion that make it out to be uncritical conjecture themselves demonstrably false, but science is 
also wholly unequipped to make unprovable subjective judgements like refutations of religion. 
Rather, science and religion occupy two separate, mutually exclusive modes of understanding the 
world. Returning to this paradigm is crucial. Religious conservatives and nonreligious liberals 
are divided against each other needlessly, because we have abandoned the antiquated yet still 
valid understanding of logos and mythos. Neither can be used to contradict the other, because 
both rely on completely different and divergent modes of information, and have completely 
different function in the human life.   
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IV. Conclusion 
Science and religion do not need each other to function, but that doesn’t imply that they can’t 
benefit from each other. 
– David Destano, “What Science can Learn from Religion”1 
  
 We started this adventure by questioning the meaning of “truth,” and I dare say that we 
are little closer to reaching a definitive answer to Governor Pilate’s question than when we 
began. What this study has shown is that the nature of truth is mired in ambiguities and open-
ended questions that may be impossible to answer with absolute certainty. A number of 
individuals, mostly with good intentions, have tried to manipulate ways of knowing and 
interacting with truth, like science and religion, in an attempt to establish an all-encompassing 
system of acquiring and understanding truth in its totality. All of these efforts have failed.   
 Neither science nor religion is capable of fully understanding the mysteries of existence. 
This is not because both are needed to comprehend the universe, nor are they inferior to some 
other source of knowledge, but because they and every other approach to knowing the world are 
fundamentally divergent by their nature. Science and religion are neither interested in nor 
capable of answering the same questions. Religion provides no meaningful mechanism for 
studying the physical universe. Science, on the other hand, is designed to do just this. It has been 
refined by thousands and thousands of years human examination and analysis – one might say 
that the entire discipline of science itself can be thought of as a macroscopic science experiment, 
focused on finding the best way to learn about the natural world. The Scientific Method gives 
scientists an unassailable mechanism to discover the true nature of the physical universe, by 
relying only on what can be observed and shown to be true. What science can demonstrate to be 
true beyond doubt can and should be accepted as truth.  
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Scientific analysis, however, fails when observation is not possible. Religion, on the 
contrary, inhabits a realm of cognition where empirical, observable data is not needed to find 
truth. And it is not alone here, but joined also by other categories of philosophy, like logic and 
mathematics. In this realm, truth is not necessarily observable, but intrinsically knowable or 
discoverable. That claims made by religion may not be empirically corroborated certainly does 
not invalidate the veracity of such unverifiable claims. It only means that they may not be 
confirmed by scientific investigation. It would be impetuous, careless, and entirely unreasonable 
(indeed, unscientific!) to assume that the unverifiability of a claim invalidates it. That something 
has not been, or even may not be, proven emphatically does not mean it has been disproven. 
I set out to show that the idea that religion and science are intellectually incompatible is a 
demonstrable and transparent fiction. I believe I have accomplished this goal. In Chapter II, the 
essential and culturally-contingent flexibility of what counted as “science” and “religion” was 
put on display. Examining the historical development of each term revealed that the alteration of 
their respective definitions to contradict the other was a deliberate and inappropriate effort by 
elites to eliminate intellectual competition. The result was that science and religion were 
rendered unrecognizable, forced to awkwardly ask questions they were not designed to explore 
and are not capable of answering. Returning science and religion to their proper, respective 
spheres shows the conflict between the two to be an unfounded artificiality. There is not, and 
never has been, any genuine intellectual conflict between science and religion.  
 
A Vision for the Future 
 I have been told by a religious mentor of mine that a lesson is a waste of time unless it 
can be applied to the immediate lives of those who hear it. With that in mind, I want to close this 
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essay by expressing my hopes for how the message communicated here can positively affect the 
lives of those who hear it.   
 The notion that science and religion are at odds is not simply false. It is a destructive lie 
capable of dividing peoples and crushing individuals. I have seen people slip into intense 
depression because “science” had convinced them that their religion is false and now life has no 
meaning. I have seen others wracked with worlds of psychological and intellectual torture 
because they believe standing strong in their faith meant sacrificing appeals to reason, and 
enduring the social humiliation that would inevitably result. How we choose to approach the 
relationship between religion and science has real and serious consequences. At stake are not 
simply abstract philosophical positions, but the most intimate and personal convictions of real 
human beings.  
Pope John Paul II said, "Science can purify religion from error and superstition; religion 
can purify science from idolatry and false absolutes."2 I love science, and I love religion. I pains 
me to see them pitted against each other – and actual people pitted against each other, by 
extension. What pains me the most is that this division is completely unnecessary, and yet it 
seems to become further ingrained in society’s collective mind with each passing day. What it 
will take to dispel the fiction that science and religion are intrinsically in conflict with each other 
is the willingness of people like you – the reader – to set aside preconceived biases and 
deliberately examine the facts of the debate.  
Despite what we have been taught to believe – despite what we may want to believe – 
there are absolutely no reasonable grounds to claim that science and religion are anything but 
fully intellectually compatible. Neither gives one a complete picture of reality, and much can be 
gained when the two are used in tandem. I eagerly look forward to the day when the society at 
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large embraces once again what it used to understand implicitly to be true: science cannot prove 
or disprove religion, and religion cannot prove or disprove science. The two ask fundamentally 
different questions, and to turn to both rather than one or the other is to find more complete and 
satisfying answers, and to achieve a better understanding of the way the world works. 
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